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- I wonder, sir, do you feel that the Pentagon is keeping faith with
those volunteers in the numerous stop-loss orders that have been
called in the past two years, including the one called by the Army
yesterday in which prospective retirees will not be allowed to go
from Iraq and Afghanistan, until they get home and possibly 90
days beyond that. Do you think that the Pentagon is keeping faith
with those people?
- I do, Charlie. I think the way one can-first of all, you've got to
remember that each person involved in the armed forces, active and
reserve and Guard, volunteered, and they made a conscious decision
to serve their country. And God bless them; we appreciate that
they've done that.1
Secretary Rumsfeld at the United States Department of Defense
News Briefing, January 6, 2004.
I. INTRODUCTION
Near Mosul, a suicide bomber entered a dining tent for United States
military officers and detonated an explosive device that killed twenty-two
people and wounded sixty-nine others.2  The story was particularly
disturbing because it happened in a mess hall, a place soldiers "assume they
are safe."3  But there was another disturbing aspect to this story, hidden
away in the quiet life of one soldier-Army Specialist Jonathon Castro. 4 He
expressed personal reservations about the war in Iraq before he deployed,
but served faithfully out of a deep sense of obligation and loyalty to his
country.5 The term of his tour was involuntarily extended, and he died in
. United States Department of Defense, News Transcript, DoD News Briefing - Secretary
Rumsfeld and General Myers, Jan. 6, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040106
-secdefl 104.html [hereinafter Briefing].
2. John Hendren, The Conflict in Iraq; Blast Likely a Suicide Bombing; Fatal Attack on Iraq
Base Seen as an Inside Job, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2004, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Wendy Thermos, Army Spc. Jonathon Castro, 21. Corona; Killed in Mess Hall Blast, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at B14.
5. Id. "Though Castro felt an obligation to carry out his military duty, he questioned whether
the U.S. had a legitimate reason for being in Iraq, his mother said." Id.
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the now infamous mess hall blast of December 21, 2004.6 Every loss of life
is tragic, but this death was particularly egregious. You see, after
completion of the terms of his contract in June, Castro's separation date was
involuntarily extended, and he was ordered to remain in Iraq for at least
three more months.7 The order seems troublesome enough at the thought of
him returning months after he was scheduled to do so, but it became so
much worse-he died six months after his contracted return home. 8
What is a soldier to do? Military service is dangerous, but when a
soldier nears the end of his or her contract the concerns increase. Many have
planned family and career developments around a termination date, and so
the stakes grow higher for both them and the people to whom they have
made commitments. Specialist Dana Jensen faced that dilemma and chose
not to go back.9 He enlisted as a member of the United States Army
National Guard's "Try One" Program10 in Winchester, Virginia, but his unit
was called up, which extended his obligation for the duration of his
deployment. " More concerned about family, Jensen refused to report for
duty' 2 and was sent to the Army's desertion center with a reputation forever
tarnished.'3 Many among his community now shun him as a deserter,
traitor, and a coward.' 4  Those outraged at the involuntary extension of
soldier contracts, and touched by the gravity of his decision, respect his
choice to reject the federal government's authority to extend his enlistment
contract. 15
This is not an article about the propriety of any of the United States'




9. Michelle Boorstein, Walking Away From a Call to Serve, WASH. POST, May 22, 2004, at
B01.
10. See infra notes 102, 140-41, 232 and accompanying text.
11. Boorstein, supra note 9, at B01.
12. Id. This decision is termed going "absent without leave." Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The local military community was outraged and boycotted Jensen's real estate firm. Id.
An eight-year veteran named Bill Germelman did not mince any words:
Here's a guy who willingly shirked the obligation to his comrades as well as the state and
federal government. You tell me if that's someone you want to do business with? He's
enjoying a cafe latte while all my friends are sitting at Fort Bragg awaiting their fate ....
We are seething.
Id. At the local Elks Club, Scott Aiken "first joked that Jensen should 'be shot,' then said he never
should have joined the Guard if he wasn't willing to go." Id.
15. Two local women were quoted as strongly supporting his decision, sympathizing with the
bind he faced. Id. Despite this kind of support, Jensen himself recognized, "'I'm not seen as the
good guy.., and I never will be."' Id.
or about any particular administration's agenda-perceived or propagated.
This Article is about those who are the hands and feet of such commitments
and agendas; the lives that are committed bravely to the service of the
United States of America in recruiting offices of all types in locations all
around the country. Soldiers are asked to sign enlistment contracts which
create the parameters of their employment. They sign their lives away,
placing their liberty in the hands of the government, and all they get in return
is a guarantee that the government will comply with the laws of the United
States, including those that apply to terms that govern the length of their
service. Ultimately, it is up to the federal government how these contracts
are served, and seemingly, when they will end, directing the destinies of
these brave men and women. This Article examines a particular
circumstance in the exercise of that power-what happens when a soldier is
denied the right to leave-and concludes that though it may be deemed
legal, the United States is just not keeping the faith of its faithful servants
when those servants must rely the most.
Section II explains the stop-loss policy and its application. It begins
with a look at the military framework within which the stop-loss policy
directly operates, followed by the policy's relationship to the political
machinery responsible for its implementation. The section ends with an
overview of how the policy's application has been challenged in recent
history. Section III examines these challenges in detail, illustrating both the
past and present state of the law. Section IV analyzes the legal issues
common to these challenges, discussing those principles that seem largely
established and those that are better suited for further litigation. Section V
concludes by asserting that, despite the legal holes in the stop-loss policy
which make it ripe for new suits, the courts will continue to affirm the
application of stop-loss. Ultimately, if the stop-loss policy is to change, it is
not the Judicial branch, but the Executive and Legislative branches which
will have to act to keep the faith with the American soldier.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Stop-Loss Defined
Reading the United States Department of Defense definition of stop-
loss, 16 one could mistakenly get the impression that the policy is simple.
The definition is brief: "Presidential authority under Title 10 U.S. Code
12305 to suspend laws relating to promotion, retirement, or separation of
any member of the Armed Forces determined essential to the national
16. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02,
Stop-Loss, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/s/05125.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
The Joint Doctrine Division maintains the online dictionary which is searchable as amended through
August 31, 2005.
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security of the United States."' 7 Codified as suggested by the definition in
10 U.S.C. § 12305, the primary stop-loss power is found in subsection (a):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during any period
members of a reserve component are serving on active duty
pursuant to an order to active duty under authority of section 12301,
12302, or 12304 of this title [10 USCS § 12301, 12302, or 12304],
the President may suspend any provision of law relating to
promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of
the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the
national security of the United States. 1
8
A soldier placed on stop-loss is denied his or her contracted separation
date and forced to remain on active duty at a current post or deployed to
another. 19
It was passed after the staffing difficulties of the Vietnam War, and
according to military officials, keeps the United States forces strong enough
to meet the various military commitments worldwide. 0 It was first used
during the Persian Gulf War in 1990, and it certainly met its first test with
success. 21 With far less fanfare and public ridicule than it sees today, the
stop-loss provision was used during the Persian Gulf War to plug significant
gaps in service.22 As Americans watched Operation Desert Storm on their
televisions, there was a sense of both horror and awe.23 When it was over,
its short duration was taken largely for granted as the new face of modem
warfare. Somehow the rapidity of the success managed to alleviate most
worries associated with these involuntary extensions, such that only one
lawsuit challenged the power.24
17. Id. This definition is a reproduction of the language of the cited statute.
18. 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2006).
19. See United States Department of Defense, DOD Authorizes Stop Loss, Sept. 24, 2001, http://
www.defenselink.mil/releases/2001/b0924200 1-bt454-01 .html.
20. Josh White, Soldiers Facing Extended Tours: Critics of Army Policy Liken it to a Draft,
WASH. POST, June 3, 2004, at A01. The idea behind stop-loss was to provide consistency in the
units deployed so that new people were not constantly thrust into a tightly functioning unit. Lately,
although the rhetoric from top military officials has stayed the same, the talk has shifted to a
discussion of the increasing difficulties in maintaining the appropriate troop levels worldwide.
21. Id.
22. Id. It has also been used intermittently between the two Gulf Wars. See infra note 55.
23. See David Kirkpatrick, News Industry Plans for War and Worries About Lost Ads, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at C2 (discussing the impact of the Persian Gulf War on network and cable
television); Peter Applebome, Faded Glory: Looking Back at the Gulf War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1992, at Al (analyzing the effects and perceptions of the war).
24. See infra Part III.A.
More recently, stop-loss has been used to support the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan.25 Although all branches have implemented stop-loss at
one point or another, 26 the Army's use of the policy is the best illustrative
example. Initiated most recently on November 30, 2001, the stop-loss order
issued in the Army "allow[ed] the Army to retain soldiers with critical skills
on active duty beyond their date of separation for an open-ended period.,
2 7
Several modifications of the policy ensued, changing which officers and
enlisted specialties were under such an order and which divisions-Active
Army, Ready Reserve, or National Guard-were affected. 8 Modifications
were also made to the length of time that soldiers' service could be
extended. The policy was announced in 2001 as an "open-ended" extension,
and it was not limited until September 2002, when an order restricted
extensions to no more than twelve months after the contracted for separation
date was issued.2 9  Even in its twelve month iteration, the policy places a
significant burden on the life and liberty of soldiers, one that may not have
been contemplated when it was first used more than a decade ago.3 °
25. See supra note 23.
26. Lisa Burgess, Army Puts All Units Tapped For Iraq, Afghanistan on Stop-Loss, Stop-Move,
STARS AND STRIPES, June 3, 2004, available at http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&
article=21706&archive=true. The Army's most recent use of the policy best exemplifies the many
different ways the policy changes and affects soldiers.
27. Army Enacts 'Stop-Loss' For Some Specialties, Army News Service, Dec. 4, 2001,
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story-id-key=1469 [hereinafter Army Enacts]. "Active duty"
is defined as "[flull-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This includes
members of the Reserve Components serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not
include full-time National Guard duty." Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, Active Duty, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
data/a/00040.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
28. The initial policy affected only selected officer and enlisted specialties in the Active Army.
Army Enacts, supra note 27. In January 2002, the policy was expanded to include the Ready
Reserve and National Guard. Marcia Triggs, Stop Loss Expands to Reserve Components, Army
News Service, Jan. 2, 2002, http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story-idkey= 1178. The Active
Army was removed from the stop-loss order in May 2003 but reinstituted in November 2003. Army
Announces Changes in Stop Loss, Army News Service, May 29, 2003, http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/
read.php?story-id key=161; United States Army News Release, Army Announces Implementation of
the Active Army Unit Stop Loss/Stop Movement Program, Nov. 17, 2003, http://www4.army.mil/
ocpa/read.php?story-id key='5415. There have been numerous adjustments in the specialties
affected by the orders. For a discussion of these changes, search the Army Public Affairs webpage
at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/press. For a discussion of officer ranks and the differences between
the enlisted and officers, see United States Department of Defense, The United States Military
Enlisted Rank Insignia, http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/insignias/enlisted.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2006); United States Department of Defense, The United States Military Officer Rank Insignia,
http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/insignias/officers.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
29. United States Army News Release, Army Announces New 12-Month Stop Loss Policy (Sept.
6, 2002), http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story idkey 1296. There have also been several
modifications to the timing of extensions throughout the duration of stop-loss implementation. For
the discussion of these changes, search Army Public Affairs at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/press. It
should be noted that these changes have been to effectuate specific policy goals based on war
circumstances. The policy was initially created as an "open-ended" extension. That the Army has
imposed limitations on itself cannot be equated to an external restraint on its extending power.
30. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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Whatever the case may have been, it is now being used to carry over large
numbers of soldiers for long periods of time in order to fulfill the needs of
our large and rather involved military commitments abroad.31
B. Stop-Loss and the War on Terror: How and Why?
How can the United States government tell its soldiers that they may not
leave when their contracts conclude? According to the Authorization for
Use of Military Force, passed on September 18, 2001, the United States
faced the threat of terrorism and was in a state of emergency, violent
emergency. 32  The Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq
33
stated that the United States faced grave threat from the destructive
capabilities and ambitions of the nation of Iraq.3 4  Once approved by
Congress, these propositions of military action became the trigger under the
War Powers Resolution 35 to permit the deployment of American troops to
endeavors abroad.3 6 When the President wields authority as Commander-in-
31. Esther Schrader, The Conflict in Iraq; Troops Told They Can't Leave Army, L.A. TIMES,
June 3, 2004, at Al. One anonymous senior officer called the program "a finger in the dike," but
there seems to be no question that the United States is trying to stretch the number of troops to cover
many positions world-wide. Id. Lieutenant General Franklin L. Hagenbeck stated, "I don't think
there's a question that here in the near term that the United States Army, active and reserved, is
stretched." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
32. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
33. Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
34. Id.
35. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2005). Passed as Public Law 93-148, the Resolution provides in part:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
Id. Note that when the President does not have a congressional declaration of war or authorization
for specific use of troops, he or she may only continue the use of such troops for sixty days (unless
extended specifically by Congress). 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2005). The President may extend this
period only for thirty more days if he or she makes written certification to Congress of the
"unavoidable military necessity." Id.
36. See PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS 3-7 (2005). Irons argues that "the Framers placed the war-
declaring power solely in the hands of Congress," and that "[t]hey also limited the president's
authority as commander in chief of the armed forces, in the absence of a declared war, to that of
'repelling' attacks on American territory or of taking 'reprisals' for attacks on its citizens or property
in foreign countries or on high seas." Id. at 3-4. Initially in American history, "[w]ithout a prior
declaration of war by Congress, presidents could act only in 'emergencies' and for limited periods."
Id. at 4. However, "every president since Nixon has disregarded-and in some cases flatly
disobeyed-the provisions of what has become a monument to legislative futility." Id. at 7. The
three military commitments to the cases presented here have been as a result of Congress approving
a "blank-check authorization" for use of military force abroad each time. Id. at 7-9. No formal
declaration of war, and no limit to the war-making power. Id.; see also BRIAN HALLET, THE LOST
ART OF DECLARING WAR (1998) (chronicling the historic rise and fall of the formal war declaration);
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Chief under the War Powers Resolution, he assumes other powers, not the
least of which is the power to "suspend any provision of law relating to
promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed
forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of
the United States."37 The idea that the Commander-in-Chief can make these
suspensions may seem innocuous, but the power is great. It is under this
power-to suspend separations-that the President has involuntarily
extended the terms of service of men and women who have already
completed their term of service as defined in their enlistment contracts. That
power appears far more oppressive as the current military commitments
drone on with ends nowhere in sight.
When pressed as to why the stop-loss orders were necessary in a
January 2004 press conference, United States Secretary of Defense, Donald
H. Rumsfeld, was quick to point out that it was the recent history of "poor
balance. . . in the active and Reserve components of the department" that
created a need to retain certain skill sets and create adequate overlap
between incoming and outgoing soldiers in the field.38 Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, pointed to a change in
American warfare over time, stating that "[i]n World War II, the armed
forces went to war, and they stayed until victory. In Vietnam, units initially
went to Vietnam, and then we replaced people individually, not by unit."'3 9
With a dubious rationalization for the burden such a policy causes and
wavering rationale for its use, President George W. Bush's administration
has vindicated little. 40  But then again, the federal government admits the
David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 183, 212 (1996) (discussing the disregard in recent
history of the constitutional requirement of declared war); RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON
WARS 74 (2002) (explaining the Clinton decision to use troops in Bosnia as substituting the
judgment of the United Nations for the judgment of Congress). But see JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF
WAR AND PEACE 143 (2005) (arguing that the Framers intended a more "flexible" approach to the
declaration of war under which initiated hostilities since World War 1I have squarely fallen).
37. 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2000).
38. Briefing, supra note 1.
39. Id.
40. Involuntary extensions have ruffled plenty of feathers and caused an image problem for the
Department of Defense. The press has held the administration's collective feet to the fire. In fact,
these involuntary extensions were the subject of the very first question at the January 2004 press
conference as Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers were challenged that the United States may
not be treating its all-volunteer forces with the honesty they deserve. Id. In a long answer, Secretary
Rumsfeld minimized the magnitude of the policy's ramifications. "I'm told there are about 1,500
out of a force in Afghanistan and Iraq that numbers, what, 130,000-plus, that are stop loss .... " Id.
Moments later, Secretary Rumsfeld was corrected and reminded that the number of soldiers placed
on stop-loss orders was more accurately approximated at 3,500. Id. General Myers followed and
reiterated the critical need to maintain soldier numbers and the weight of the responsibility taken on
by a soldier in enlistment:
The only thing I'd add to that is the obvious, but we've got to step back for just a second.
You know, we are a nation at war. We've got a large part of our force over there doing
very important work in two countries in a region that has previously and still is host to
terrorist organizations. This is very important for our national security. It's very
798
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orders creating involuntary extensions, more commonly referred to as stop-
loss orders, are undesirable at best.41 It is no secret that recruitment numbers
and retention rates have forced them into a difficult situation.42 Certain
branches of the military have, at different times, had to announce that they
would be implementing stop-loss in order to meet their troop commitments
in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining troop presence elsewhere.43 Only
adding to the growing problem is the fact that reports seem to indicate a
sizeable fall in soldier morale, 44 and the implementation of such stop-loss
important for international security. And so, yes, the force is working very hard. We're
asking extraordinary things from the force and their families. They're responding. I
think most individuals understand and their families understand what we're asking them
to do. We're asking them a lot. They're responding magnificently.
Id.
41. See United States Department of Defense, News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Town Hall
Meeting in Kuwait, Dec. 8, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr2004l208-
secdefl 761 .html [hereinafter Town Hall].
42. On Tuesday, January 24, 2006, "an unreleased study conducted for the Pentagon said the
Army was stretched thin and close to a snapping point because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan."
Top General: U.S. Forces 'Stretched,' (CBS television broadcast Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2006/01/26/iraq/mainl 240559.shtml?CMP=OTCRSSFeed&source=RSS&attr-
U.S._1240559 [hereinafter Top General]. Only a day later, Secretary Rumsfeld disputed the claims,
saying that reports characterizing the forces as strained near the breaking point were "just not
consistent with the facts." Id. The following day, General George Casey was quoted at a press
conference saying, "The forces are stretched ... and I don't think there's any question of that." Id.
He continued to explain that the Army was still in the process of a modernization strategy to
alleviate the strain. Id. Only adding to the mixed messages, President Bush was asked in a press
conference that day to comment on the conflicting reports. The White House, Press Conference of
the President, Jan. 26, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060126.html. He
never directly answered the question, but asserted that the real question was "whether or not we can
win victory in Iraq." Id. But the unreleased study "found that the Army may not be able to retain
and recruit enough troops to defeat the insurgency in Iraq." Top General, supra.
43. The Connection: Trying to Stop Stop-Loss, (NPR broadcast Dec. 12, 2004), http://www.
theconnection.org/shows/2004/12/20041210 a-main.asp [hereinafter The Connection]. Gary Solis,
visiting professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, opined that while continuity
in the units may be part of the reason stop-loss has been implemented, there is a serious lack of
troops to meet requirements worldwide. Id. He approximated that there were 138,000 troops in
Iraq, 11,500 in Afghanistan, 37,500 in Korea, and 44,000 in Japan among the large troop
installations worldwide. See supra note 31.
44. Staff Sergeant Latazinsky famously asked Secretary Rumsfeld about the stop-loss policy
during his visit to Kuwait. Town Hall, supra note 41. She reminded him that she joined an all-
volunteer Army but was now serving under stop-loss orders and asked him when the military would
stop using the program. Id. Her complaint was only one of many, which signaled to many (from
politicians to military experts) that dissatisfaction was rampant. Thomas E. Ricks, Rumsfeld Gets
Earful from Troops, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2004, at A01. See 60 Minutes If: Active Duty: No Way
Out, (CBS television broadcast June 16, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/
06/16/601/main623492.shtml (quoting former Army Captain Andrew Exum who claims soldiers are
disgruntled); David Moniz, Public Dissent May Be New, But Issues Are Old, USA TODAY, Dec. 9,
2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/worldliraq/2004-12-08-armor-usatx.htm (quoting Senator
John McCain, R-AZ, "Stop loss is a terrible thing for morale."); Editorial, Strain Begins to Show As
Iraq Stretches Military Thin, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
programs can only serve to further drain that morale, which will in turn hurt
retention rates.45 This leaves the military no choice, in its estimation, but to
continue to enforce these policies to maintain the forces it already controls.46
C. Stop-Loss Challenged. From Bush to Bush
Exercise of Executive power in the United States has met with many
challenges throughout history. President Lincoln widely expanded
Executive power in his tenure as President, "assert[ing] the right to proclaim
martial law behind the lines, to arrest people without warrant, to seize
property, to suppress newspapers, to prevent the use of the post office for
'treasonable' correspondence, to emancipate slaves, [and] to lay out a plan
of reconstruction., 47  In the course of Lincoln's innovative approach to
national stabilization, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to speak
on the growth of the Commander-in-Chief role.48 It upheld Lincoln's power
to institute a blockade on ports under his determination of national
emergency, 49 but it rejected his unauthorized suspension of habeas corpus.5°
Later, President Franklin D. Roosevelt took a similarly expansive view of
his power, and saw similar challenges to its exercise. Most notably, the
Court upheld the Executive power to order the seizure and removal of
Japanese Americans in response to perceived threats during a state of
emergency.5' President Harry Truman acted with the same thunder during
the Korean War, ordering the seizure of steel mills in the wake of a labor
dispute, but after challenge to the action, the Supreme Court held that this
was a stretch beyond the bounds of his constitutional authority. 52
editorials/2004-12-09-our-viewx.htm (discussing the troop response to a "morale-boosting visit" by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld).
45. See Ricks, supra note 44, at A01.
46. See Town Hall, supra note 41. Secretary Rumsfeld said it is a policy to maintain unit
cohesion designed to keep consistency. Id.
47. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 58 (1973).
48. Id. at 64-67; see also FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF
WAR 70-71 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's rationale dealing with Executive power in
war time).
49. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). It should be noted that this approval of Executive
power was confined, in the majority opinion, to times of domestic emergency like insurrection or
invasion. SCHLESINGER, supra note 47, at 65.
50. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). Congress later
authorized Lincoln's suspension proclamations seven months after his initial announcement of the
suspension of habeas corpus. IRONS, supra note 36, at 80. "Before the Civil War ended, more than
10,000 people had been arrested and jailed without recourse to habeas corpus." Id. This turned out
to be the "greatest violation of constitutional rights until the mass incarceration of some 120,000
Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II." Id.
51. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Though not a unilateral act, it was an
incredible and shameful display of presidential prerogative in a time of war. SCHLESINGER, supra
note 47, at 116; see also WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 48, at 243.
52. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). It was not clear where
President Truman "thought the limits on his emergency authority were." SCHLESINGER, supra note
47, at 142. "If he could seize steel mills under his inherent powers, could he also seize newspapers
800
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Just as historical exercise of broad Executive power has been met with
substantial challenge, those affected by the presidential imposition of stop-
loss have not remained silent about their treatment under the policy. It
began with the first use of stop-loss under President George H.W. Bush's
authority during the Persian Gulf War53 as a soldier brought the first legal
attack to the stop-loss policy. 4 Although the courts would remain relatively
free of controversy over stop-loss for the next decade,55 the advent of
George W. Bush's War on Terror56 brought a wave of legal confrontation
about the implementation of the policy.57 Each legal battle was a little
different than the next, but fought under the same mantra: the federal
government cannot do this.
Many reasons for the policy's invalidity have been suggested as a result
of these lawsuits. Some of the reasons are more intuitive than others, largely
because of the variety of circumstances in which these cases have arrived.
One soldier had been on active duty for four years when he was placed on
stop-loss and required to deploy to the front lines of conflict.58  Two
soldiers, having completed full terms of service, thought they were enlisting
in year-long trial programs, but wound up placed on stop-loss and were not
permitted to leave after their year was up.5 9 Still another found himself
placed on stop-loss during the last month of his enlistment.60 His contract
expired after the mobilization under the stop-loss order, but prior to his call
and radio stations?" Id. at 142-43. This limitation was an important, albeit minimal, step in the
Supreme Court expressing limitation on the growth of Executive power. Donald L. Robinson,
Presidential Prerogative and the Spirit of American Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 114, 120-23 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George
eds. 1996).
53. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
54. See infra Part III.A.
55. Stop-loss was used among the various branches during the Clinton administration's
commitment of troops to Bosnia and Kosovo. 33,000 Troops Face Call-Up, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr.
17, 1999, at 13. In sharp contrast, since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001,
through the end of December 2004, stop-loss was used eleven times. The Connection, supra note
43.
56. The War on Terror really began with the passage of the Authorization for Use of Military
Force on September 18, 2001, but was cemented by President George W. Bush's radio address on
September 29, 2001. President George W. Bush, Radio Address of the President to the Nation (Sept.
29, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html. He stated, "This is a
different kind of war, which we will wage aggressively and methodically to disrupt and destroy
terrorist activity." Id.
57. See infra Parts III.B-D.
58. See infra Part III.A.
59. See infra Parts IlI.B, III.D.
60. See infra Part II1.C.
to active duty.61 With such diversity in circumstances, the lawsuits have
been by no means identical, but many share common issues.
Stop-loss has been challenged on four general grounds. The first
argument, one that has been fanned by the media, is that the Executive
power of the President to utilize stop-loss has been invoked improperly.62
Accusing the President of circumventing the prescribed legal and
administrative channels required by statute, the arguments have focused on
the insufficiency of the requisite circumstances to allow the President to
place soldiers on stop-loss. 63 The second argument is that the United States
Government has breached its contract with the soldiers placed on stop-loss.
64
Military contracts are evaluated under traditional contract principles; thus
the soldiers argue that the terms of their contract have been breached 65 or
that they have been misled into acquiescing to it. 66 The third argument is
that involuntary extension of enlistment contracts under stop-loss violates a
soldier's procedural due process rights.67 Such an argument turns on
principles of notice and fairness applicable to the contract inquiry, but is
rooted in the constitutional guarantees of such things for each person. 68
Finally, a fourth argument has been raised that views the other statutes
related to and invoked by the stop-loss statute as presenting bars to the
implementation of stop-loss by the President. 69 Because there are so many
different aspects of military service, including both physical and status
transitions, there are a wide range of statutes that coordinate to form the
intricate parameters of military employment.7 ° Several such statutes have
been construed by those bringing suit to mean that the power conferred by




Despite their great variety, the legal attacks on the stop-loss policy have
been fruitless. None of the cases have reached the Supreme Court for
adjudication, two were heard by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit,72 and two met their fate in district courts.73 The review of each was
clear, though maybe not thorough. Several issues were dismissed with little
discussion, especially those not raised clearly or succinctly in the courts'
61. See infra note 182.
62. See infra Parts IlIl.A, IlI.C1, II.D.1.
63. See infra Parts III.A, III.C.I, III.D.1.
64. See infra Parts III.B.l.a, III.C.2.
65. See infra Parts III.B.I.a, III.C.2.
66. See infra Part 11I.B.I .b.
67. See infra Parts III.B.2, 1I.C.3, III.D.2.
68. See infra Parts III.B.2, III.C.3, III.D.2.
69. See infra Part III.D.3.
70. See infra Part III.D.3.
71. See infra Part III.D.3.
72. See infra Parts III.C-D.
73. See infra Parts III.A-B.
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estimation. A close evaluation reveals that some of the legal questions are
in large part closed, although a slight opening may remain for future
challengers.
1II. THE LAWSUITS
A. The Original Stop-Loss Suit: Sherman v. United States 75 and Executive
Authority
1. Executive Authority
Although involuntary extensions have received increased media
coverage lately, lawsuits against the United States for this policy are not
new. In 1991, Sergeant Craig L. Sherman petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus to the District Court of Georgia to prevent his dispatch to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.76 Sherman enlisted with the Air Force Reserve
under a contract which provided that he would serve in active duty for only
four years.77 He began active duty in 1986 and was thus set to conclude by
the terms of his contract in 1990.78 However, in 1990, President George
H.W. Bush declared a national emergency and delegated 79 his authority
under 10 U.S.C. § 1230580 to the Secretary of Defense, which eventually
resulted in the suspension of all separations of those in essential units. 8'
Sherman pursued the usual channels to avoid his extension and deployment
74. See infra notes 171-74, 224-27, 284-88 and accompanying text.
75. 755 F. Supp. 385 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
76. Id. at 386.
77. Originally, his contract provided for a period of active duty of not less than four years. Id.
78. Id.
79. Under the Executive Order Number 12,728 of August 22, 1990, the President delegated his
authority to perform two critical functions. Exec. Order No. 12,728, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,029 (Aug. 22,
1990). Section 1 authorizes the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation
(commanding the Coast Guard when not under the direction of the Navy), to "suspend any provision
of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces
determined to be essential to the national security of the United States," and to make the
determination as to which units and specialties are essential. Id. Section 2 allows the further
delegation of the power as may be necessary among subordinates. Id. The order was amended by
Executive Order Number 13,286 on February 28, 2003, to give this authority to the Secretary of
Homeland Security instead of Transportation. Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,626
(Feb. 28, 2003).
80. At the time of the case, it was codified as 10 U.S.C. § 673(c). Sherman, 755 F. Supp. at 387.
81. Id. at 386.
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by applying for waiver. 82 When his waiver was denied he was ordered to
report to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on February 8, 1991.83
Sherman's attack of the validity of the stop-loss order was simple: he
was an active duty soldier, and the stop-loss provision applied only to those
soldiers who were members of a reserve component. 84  He quoted the
language of 10 U.S.C. § 12305, which provides:
[D]uring any period members of a reserve component are serving
on active duty pursuant to an order to active duty... the President
may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement,
or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the
President determines is essential to the national security of the
United States.85
He claimed that as a soldier not serving with a reserve component, the
President did not have the authority to involuntarily extend his contract.86
The court found authorization in the heart of 10 U.S.C. § 12305, which
specifically provides that the presidential power applies to "any member of
the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national
security of the United States.",87  Under this analysis the court viewed this
provision as speaking very generally, not just about the members of a
reserve component, but to all enlisted men and women whether in the
reserves or not.88 In its analysis the court noted that though the statute
begins with direct reference to the reserves, it concludes by giving the
President authority over all persons in the armed forces. 89 The court found
that a "more logical reading" of the statute was to find that Congress meant
to give the President authority over all members of the armed forces and
specifically included the reserves to avoid any confusion. 90
82. Id. Specifically, he applied orally for a hardship waiver, but it was denied. Id. After taking
leave to be married, he submitted a written request for waiver and took leave again. Id. When he
returned his petition was denied. Id. at 387.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting what is now 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2000)).
86. Id.
87. 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
88. Sherman, 755 F. Supp. at 387-88. Sherman's point is hardly incomprehensible. The statute
begins with a clear statement specifying that the power of the President may be exercised upon
members of reserve forces. Id. at 387. It is certainly more than plausible that the clause "to any
member of the armed forces" modifies the description of the provisions that may be suspended or the
branches of the military effected. At the very least, there seems to be reasonable conflict in the
language.
89. Id. at 387.
90. Id. The court stated, "[i]t would make little sense to say that the President is allowed to call
up or extend the enlistments of reservists in case of war but that he cannot do so for active duty
personnel." Id. at 387-88. Legislative history was cited to show that Congress was concerned about
the President's lack of power to preserve "regular and reserve personnel." Id. at 387 (citing S. Rep.
No. 98-174 (1983), as reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1081, 1098) (internal quotations omitted).
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By this rationale, the court dismissed any possibility of restriction or
ambiguity in the statute, forcefully concluding:
In a nutshell, the Petitioner has asked this court to order the
termination of his contract as an enlisted man in the United States
Air Force in time of war, a decision which would trigger lawsuits
and claims by other military personnel similarly situated and bring
chaos to orderly military planning. If the law were clear that
Petitioner is entitled to be discharged, then this court would order
him discharged. 9'
2. Analysis
The court's analysis of the statutory language was as thorough as it
could be for such a minimal attack to the stop-loss authority.92 Despite its
clearly announced fear, it reasoned through the language and provided a
reasonable plain language interpretation, which defeated Sherman's claim.
93
This was the first attack and a logical, although weak, attack. Later, the
attacks would become more complex and the courts' legal analysis far
weaker on the tough points.
And with that, Sergeant Craig L. Sherman was denied his last form of
relief as the President's ultimate control over those on active duty was
vindicated. His was only the first attempt to invalidate a stop-loss extension,
and though stop-loss would remain absent from the courts for some time, the
Sherman decision did not ameliorate any of the legal conflict the policy
sparked.
B. "Try One, "Stayfor More: Qualls v. Rumsfeld 94 and the United States
as Deceiver
Over a decade later, the United States once more committed troops to
Iraq, again exhausting troop resources and necessitating stop-loss orders. 95
This time it was met with a new challenge. David W. Qualls and seven
other servicemen filed suit in opposition to the order, and Qualls filed a
Yet, isn't it equally possible that though both were a problem, this was intended to cure the latter and
not the former? Further, if both were a concern why not use inclusive language from the start?
91. Id. at 388.
92. See id. at 387.
93. Id.
94. 357 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2005).
95. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent his deployment. 96 The court
analyzed Quails' likelihood of success on the merits in order to rule on his
motion for preliminary injunction, ultimately finding his case lacking and
denying the motion.97 Unlike Sherman, Qualls' challenge was not based on
the President's authority, 98 but on basic contract principles and the
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process. 99
In 1986, Qualls joined the United States Military and remained on active
duty until 1990, when he became a member of the Individual Ready
Reserves until 1994.100 He remained unaffiliated with the military'0 ' until
he reenlisted in the Army National Guard's "Try One" program on July 7,
2003.102 Before the end of the year, the Army called him to active duty at
which time he was immediately subjected to the stop-loss order. 10 3  His
separation date was changed from July 6, 2004, a year after his reenlistment
date, to December 24, 2031, under the authority of 10 U.S.C. § 12305.'04 In
his bid to avoid such an extension, Quails argued on two main grounds.
First, he argued that such an extension was a violation of the terms of his
reenlistment contract and that he was misled into signing.'0 5 Second, he
argued that he was denied a liberty interest without notice. 106 The court took
each argument in turn.
1. Contract Principles
a. Breach
Qualls' first appeal was to contract principles, arguing that the extension
of his duty was a violation of the terms of his reenlistment contract and that
96. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
97. Id. at 286.
98. Quails did list a cause of action for "absence of statutory authority," but this argument was
really just a facet of the other three claims. Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Petition for Habeas
Corpus 7 68-69, Quails v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 04-2113) [hereinafter
Quails' Complaint]. He argued that 10 U.S.C. § 12305 "[did] not provide that Defendants can
involuntarily extend Plaintiffs' enlistment in violation of their enlistment contracts or by fraudulently
inducing them to enlist in the military under a trial program of one year and then extending their
military service indefinitely." Id. T 69. He did not include any argument regarding Executive
authority under the statute. Id. TT 68-69.
99. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 279-85.
100. Quails' Complaint, supra note 98, 18.
101. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 279-80.
102. Id. at 278. This program, as the name suggests, committed him to only one year of service.
Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Though the 2031 date seems odd, if not implausible, recall that the policy is, at its heart,
"open-ended." See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
105. Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 280-84.
106. Id. at 285.
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he was misled. 07  The court found support for applying contract law to
military contracts, stating, "[t]o determine whether the military has breached
an enlistment contract or whether an enlistment contract is invalid, courts
apply general, common law principles of contract law."' 8
Determining whether there was a breach in the terms of the contract was
the court's first task. 0 9 However, the terms themselves were the critical
controversy. Not disputing the validity of the Executive power under 10
U.S.C. § 12305, Qualls claimed that there was no provision in the contract
which included or adopted the statute as a term of the contract."0 Without
notice of such a term, Qualls argued that his contract was not subject to
extension."' Qualls' local armory kept a copy of the contract, which Quails
offered as proof of the terms of his contract. "2 According to the Army, this
copy lacked a page titled "C. Partial Statement of Existing United States
Laws," which is included in the typical contract executed by enlistees." 3
The Army's position was that the original contract contained the missing
page on the reverse side of the contract's first page, but it could not produce
the original.'
After reviewing the evidence on the terms of the contract, the court did
not anticipate a court would find a breach in a trial on the merits." 5 Quails
107. Id. at 280-85.
108. Id. at 279-80. The court also cited for support Woodrick v. Hungerford, 800 F.2d 1413, 1416
(5th Cir. 1986); Cinciarelli v. Carter, 662 F.2d 73, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and Pence v. Brown, 627
F.2d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 1980). Id. at 280. Neither party briefed the issue of what body of contract
law would apply, so the court did not speak on the choice of laws issue. Id. at 282 n.2.
109. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 235 defines breach by explaining the roles of each
contracting party: "(1) Full performance of a duty under a contract discharges the duty. (2) When
performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance is a breach." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1981). The comments explain that "a duty is discharged when it is
fully performed. Nothing less than full performance, however, has this effect and any defect in
performance, even an insubstantial one, prevents discharge on this ground." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 cmt. a (1981). In the case of the military contract, the soldier
contracts to provide services for a definite period of time subject to the contract terms. Quails argues
that the Army's refusal to permit his separation according to the contracted date is non-performance
of its duty. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 282-84.
110. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
111. Id.at280-81.
112. Id. at 280.
113. Id.
114. Id. Perhaps the most important message to soldiers from this specific legal oddity is a
reminder to keep all their paperwork. Because, as the court noted, the challenger bears the burden of
production, id. at 281, it would be wise for a soldier to understand that the government will not have
to produce its own copy to sustain its conclusions if the soldier cannot produce the one he claims is
aberrant.
115. Id. at 284. This appears to be an odd procedural misstep or factual insufficiency. It is quite
possible that an Army which does not keep its own copy of the contract could have given him a copy
to sign initially that did not include the back page alleged by the defense. In that case, the fact that
bore the burden of production at this stage, and though he claimed that the
contract he produced contained the terms to which he assented, he at no
point claimed that his document was the original or that it was identical to
the original." 6 He did not offer any copy of his own, kept by him since the
time of signing, and he did not comment about his recollection of the
contract he signed. 117 Agreeing with the Army's position, the court found
that the first page of the submitted contract did indicate that it was continued
on the following page, and thus it was likely that the missing page was on
the reverse side of the first page of the original. 118 Accepting this
proposition, the court concluded that the Partial Statement of Existing
United States Laws was a part of the contract which Qualls signed. "9
It evaluated each of the paragraphs included in the Partial Statement,
with a special focus on three. The Army claimed authorization for the
extension of the contract under paragraph 10(d)(1) which stated, "'in times
of national emergency declared by the President,' a member of the Ready
Reserve 'may be ordered to active duty... for not more than 24 consecutive
months."" 120 It also cited paragraph 9(c) of the enlistment contract which
stated "in the event of war" the contract extends "for six months after the
war ends."' 2' Finally, it cited paragraph 10(b) which stated that if reservists
are:
a member of a Reserve Component of an Armed Force at the
beginning of a period of war or national emergency declared by
Congress, or if [they] become a member during that period, [their]
military service may be extended without [their] consent until six
(6) months after the end of that period of war. 122
Acknowledging that none of these provisions expressly gave notice of
the change of the separation date from 2004 to 2031, the Army asserted that
these provisions gave notice of the possibility of the extension. 121 While the
court ultimately found notice, it did not interpret the provisions as
generously as the Army.
Of the three provisions offered in support of its position, the court found
the contract should have contained the back page is really irrelevant. For that matter, that other
contracts do is irrelevant if his didn't. Yet his unwillingness to allege in good faith that the copy was
an adequate representation of the original or his own memory to that end suggests that it may have,
in fact, not been.
116. Id. at 281-82.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 281.
119. Id. at 281-82.
120. Id. at 282.
121. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
122. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id. Note that the court was attempting to make out a fairly weak inference of notice. None
of these provisions actually mention stop-loss by name or directly list its statute. The court analyzed
which of these paragraphs provided notice of the possibility of extension under any circumstances.
808
[Vol. 34: 791, 2007] Keeping Faith
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
that the Army gave notice in paragraphs 9(c) and 10(b).12 4  The court
rejected the Army's assertion that paragraph 10(d)(1) had anything to do
with the extension of the enlistment contract. 125  While the provision gave
clear notice of the possibility of being called into active duty, "it [did] not
permit the Army to unilaterally extend an enlistment without consent in
order to make possible further service on active duty."' 126 On the other hand,
the court viewed the six-month extension term referred to in both of the
other paragraphs as providing general notice of the possibility of involuntary
extension. 127 The only triggering events necessary for the execution of those
provisions is a "state of war." 128  The argument raised by Qualls that the
United States was not in an officially declared war was summarily
dismissed. 129 According to the court, the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force on September 18, 2001,130 under which troops were sent to
Afghanistan, and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force in 2002,131
under which troops were sent to Iraq, were both essentially congressional
declarations of war. 3 2  The court further noted that this is the way that
Congress has done so with every war operation since World War 11.133
Finding all the requisite circumstances to trigger both the 9(c) and 10(b)
provisions, the court held that Qualls was subject to involuntary
extension. 134 Therefore, he had notice of the possibility of involuntary
extension, more generally, according to the stop-loss order. 1
35




128. Id. at 284 (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
131. Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
132. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 283-84. See generally IRONS, supra note 36 (discussing the
evolution of the presidential war-making power and the role--or lack thereof--of Congress in the
process).
133. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 284. The court offered two other reasons for discounting the "not
at war" argument. Id. Although Qualls argued that paragraph 9(c) was codified in 10 U.S.C. § 506,
and the legislative history of the provision uses the word "declared" once, the court found its usage
too "unclear" to require an official declaration of war. Id. Also, the court noted that it was Quails
who argued for the application of general contract principles to this case, and accepting that premise,
the court found that the terms of the contract itself make no mention of declared war. Id. With these






Qualls' next argument was also based on contract principles. He argued
that both his reenlistment contract and the entire "Try One" website
produced misrepresentations. 13 6 While the court quickly dispensed with the
notion that his reenlistment contract had failed to disclose the possibility of
involuntary extension based on its reasoning in the matter of the breach, it
was not so hasty with the website claim. 137  The program advertised an
opportunity to enlist for a one-year term, with an opportunity to terminate or
reenlist for a full term at the conclusion of that one-year term.138 However,
even under the seemingly minimal one-year commitment, a stop-loss order
can effectively extend the contract indefinitely. 139  Qualls argued that the
premise of the website is the idea that the "Try One" Program is not a full
commitment to military service. 4 ' Qualls alleged the website made an
affirmative representation that the program "allow[ed] a veteran to serve for
only one year on a trial basis before committing to a full enlistment," and
another representation was made by the fact that it was located in a part of
the website entitled "Trial Programs."141 In the reverse, Qualls argued that
the fact there was no mention of the stop-loss possibility as a mammoth
qualification to an otherwise minimal commitment constituted a material
omission on the part of the Army National Guard. 1
42
The court did not review the merits of a possible claim of fraud and
misrepresentation, because it found that Qualls' claim was facially
insufficient. 143 To succeed on such a claim, Qualls needed to prove: "(1) a
false representation or non-disclosure of material facts, (2) made with
136. Id. at 285. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 159 defines misrepresentation simply as
"[a] misrepresentation is an assertion that is not in accord with the facts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1979). According to the accompanying note:
[a] misrepresentation, being a false assertion of fact, commonly takes the form of spoken
or written words. Whether a statement is false depends on the meaning of the words in all
the circumstances, including what may fairly be inferred from them. An assertion may
also be inferred from conduct other than words. Concealment or even non-disclosure may
have the effect of a misrepresentation under the rules stated in §§ 160 and 161.
Id. § 159 cmt. a. The introductory note indicates that a successful claim makes the contract at issue
voidable. Id. §§ 159-73. Qualls raised only the terms of the contract itself as the offending
assertions. Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 285. He alleged no issues of verbal misrepresentation, or
misrepresentative non-disclosure. Id.
137. Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Though his legal claim will be discussed in some length below, it bears mentioning that
the point has greater ethical significance. The fact that a program entitled "Try One" exists as an
alternative to other forms of enlistment, under the premise that it is a trial commitment for one year,
seems to necessitate a greater level of notice of possible extension. It is not as though a soldier
believes that he or she is entering into the same kind of commitment as under a standard contract,
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knowledge of its falsity, (3) with an intent to induce reliance, and (4)
reasonable reliance on that representation."'44 Without discussing any of the
other elements required, the court held that Qualls did not prove his own
reasonable reliance on any affirmative representations or omissions. 145  The
only items he produced from the website were printed on November 22,
2004, well after his commitment was made. 146  He never submitted an
allegation or proof of any representation or omission by an actual
recruitment official. 147  Further, the court found that he never actually
alleged that he specifically relied on the website or recruitment materials,
only that these materials were targeted at recruits. 148  Without establishing
the requisite prima facie case, the court was left with no choice but to
dismiss the claim.
2. Procedural Due Process
Finally, Qualls argued that involuntarily extending his contract without
proper notice would deprive him of a significant liberty interest without the
due process of the law.149  This, he argued, was constitutionally
impermissible as violative of his procedural due process rights. 50 The
prima facie case for a procedural due process claim requires proof of: (1) a
property or liberty interest that is (2) deprived (3) without prior notice or
opportunity to be heard.' 5' The court did not evaluate the claim that the
contract extension was a "deprivation of liberty," but merely assumed that to
be the case in order to evaluate the issue of notice.5 2  Even with such a
144. Id. at 284 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 285. This point is significant as the court said quite a bit in its silence. Since it did not
need to reach the other elements of the claim, these elements remained open to interpretation in the
recruitment context. It did briefly state that the Partial Statement of Existing United States Laws
provided notice sufficient to rebut a charge of misrepresentation, referencing its prior discussion of
contract terms. Id. Yet it was clearly a perfunctory statement, without any explanation as to how
that analysis directly applied to a charge of misrepresentation. Nevertheless, the statement would
later be used in a subsequent case as rationale to dismiss the notion once more. See infra Part
III.B.4.
146. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 285 n.7. Again, this was either an unfortunate oversight, or indicative that facts to
support such an assertion just did not exist. See supra note 114.
149. Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
150. Id.
151. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 905 (2004). According to this analysis, the court is
charged with the duty to evaluate the interest asserted to decide if it meets the Fourteenth
Amendment requirements of life, liberty, or property. Id. If so, the court must decide what process
is required, which depends on a variety of factors. Among the factors considered are the nature of
the right asserted, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on the proceeding. Id.
152. Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
grant, the court reasoned that the claim would likely fail for two reasons.
First, relying on the analysis of the contracts claims, the court held that they
did in fact have notice of the possibility of the stop-loss involuntary
extension by the Partial Statement of Existing United States Laws. 15
3
Second, it found that the extension to which his contract was subjected was
in no way arbitrary or capricious, as many similarly situated others faced the
same extension. 5 4 The court found these reasons persuasive and held that
he received the "notice that was due."'
155
3. Epilogue
After Qualls' motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, the Army
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, both of which were
granted. 156 The court found that he was no longer "serving pursuant to the
allegedly unlawful extension of service that form[ed] the basis of his entire
action."' 157  Qualls re-enlisted in February 2005 for another six years, but
argued that he was under economic duress to do so. 5 8 The court thought
little of this argument, calling it "a thinly veiled attempt to escape the
consequences of his actions."' 5 9  As such, the court found that there was
"nothing to remedy." 160
In the amended complaint,' 6 1 Qualls reasserted his claims for breach,




156. Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 412 F. Supp. 2d 40, 45 (D.D.C. 2006).
157. Id. at43.
158. He argued that he had no other way to pay his bills and take care of his family and so needed
to take the re-enlistment bonus. Id. at 43. The court maintained that "to prove economic duress a
plaintiff must establish: (1) a wrongful act or improper threat; (2) the absence of a reasonable
alternative to entering the agreement; and (3) the lack of free will." Id. at 44 (citing Applied
Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 1990)). According
to the court, Quails experienced no wrongdoing and was perfectly capable of not re-enlisting. Id. In
a biting editorial, the court stated, "It is ironic that Quails is trying to maintain an action seeking his
release from the military when he himself precluded that very outcome." Id. Perhaps a bit of irony
lies in the courts' statement, as it ignored the deep dilemma of a soldier of modest means. If facing
stop-loss for any period past February, it makes sense that Quails might have accrued weighty
obligations, which could be alleviated by his re-enlistment. It is a six-year price to pay for a bonus
needed desperately, while being forced to continue service under the old contract anyway.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 43.
161. The Army moved to dismiss the claims of Quails and his anonymous co-complainants, and
the court granted the motion. Quails v, Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2005). It was dismissed
without prejudice so that those willing to identify themselves could take up their claims once more.
Id. In the amended complaint, six of the John Doe's were dropped and the name of Rafael Perez
was added. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Petition for Habeas Corpus 5, Quails v.
Rumsfeld, 412 F. Supp. 2d 40,45 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04-2113) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
162. Amended Complaint, supra note 161, 38-40, 41, 44-46. The statutory authority argument
812
[Vol. 34: 791, 2007] Keeping Faith
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
his co-complainant Rafael Perez.' 63  Perez did not reenlist, therefore the
court could not dismiss his claims as with Qualls', but the court reached only
his misrepresentation claim since he did not respond to the Army's motion
to dismiss each one.164  Though the court did reach the Perez's
misrepresentation claim, it was quickly dismissed in the same manner as
Qualls' claim was at the injunction stage. 165 The court added very little to
the misrepresentation analysis it gave in Qualls' denial of injunction. In
fact, the court cited the previous decision for the linchpin of its rationale:
"the contract, with its statement of United States laws,16 6 does indeed put
Qualls on notice that the Army might involuntarily extend his term of
service." 167 It reasoned that the words and actions of the recruiters did not
add up to material misrepresentation, and any possibility of misleading
language on the contract itself was disclaimed by the reference to United
States laws. 16 8  With that, Perez's claim, as well as the case, was
dismissed. 169
4. Analysis
It seems that the court took pains to be dismissive with Qualls' claims.
The court's analysis paid little attention to the misrepresentation and due
process arguments, in favor of a lengthy notice analysis, in its decision on
breach. 7 Qualls could have made the misrepresentation and due process
arguments stronger by alleging separate facts and distinguishing them more
effectively from the breach of contract argument."'7 That notwithstanding,
the court may not have even received that well. In its subsequent dismissal
of the entire case, the court seemed even more conclusory, despite the
addition of another similarly situated plaintiff.'72 With such a dismissive
eye toward those claims, it is hard to stomach pieces of the notice rationale,
but none harder than equating the authorizations for military force with a
was also reprised, but was again swallowed by his other causes of action. Id. 42-43; see supra
note 98.
163. Amended Complaint, supra note 161, 38-40, 41,44-46.
164. Quails, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 44 n.1.
165. Id. at45.
166. The court was referring to the "Partial Statement of Existing United States Laws." See supra
note 110 and accompanying text.
167. Quails, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 44-45 (quoting Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 285).
168. Id. at 44-45.
169. Id. at 45.
170. Quails, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 284-85.
171. Id. at284-86.
172. Quails, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
formal declaration of war.173 Although it may be tempting to eliminate any
distinction as a semantic diversion, the court merely cites long-standing
practice as the source of the equivalency." 4 While a parallel should be
necessarily drawn, a rejection of the distinction, without little more in the
way of analysis, should trouble even the most sympathetic of readers.
With the shortcomings in both Quails' complaint and the Qualls court's
analysis, the next case appeared to be a tidier bundle of issues, fully alleged
and fully reviewable.
C. Putting it All Together Now: Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 175 A Better Test
Case?
Only one year after Qualls, stop-loss was the subject of another lawsuit.
This time the challenge would incorporate elements of the two before it in a
format that was presented slightly better than its predecessors. Unlike
Qualls, Sergeant Emiliano Santiago enlisted fully in the Army National
Guard, but was placed under the stop-loss order during the last month of his
service. 176 After seeking exception to the stop-loss order through the proper
administrative channels, Santiago filed a petition of habeas corpus and a
petition of mandamus in the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon, which was dismissed and from which he appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 1
77
Sergeant Emiliano Santiago enlisted in the Army National Guard at the
age of 18 on June 28, 1996, for a term of eight years to expire on June 27,
2004.178 After completing basic training and advanced personal training,
Santiago was released from active duty and only required to attend monthly
weekend training sessions. 179  The month his contract was due to expire,
Santiago leamed his entire unit was subject to the stop-loss order. 180 Their
orders included "six weeks of training, followed by deployment to
Afghanistan for one year in support of 'Operation Enduring Freedom."". 8.
173. Qualls, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
174. Id.
175. 425 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2005).
176. Id. at 552-53.
177. Id. at 553. Santiago immediately sought relief from the stop-loss order. Id. He retained
counsel who quickly sent a letter to the unit commander requesting release. Id. The letter gave
notice that it was an "attempt to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit to enforce his
rights." Id. (internal quotations omitted). In its reply, the Oregon Military Department confirmed
the extension of his contract and assured him that any waiver application would make its way
through the "chain of command." Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, after examining the
waiver policy, Santiago determined that any waiver application would be fruitless. Id.
178. Id. at 552.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 553.
181. Id.
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A unique situation arose: his contract expired after the mobilization under
the stop-loss order, but prior to his call to active duty. 
1 82
Santiago's arguments amalgamated the highlights of his predecessors in
battle. He argued that the President lacked the requisite congressional
authority to extend his contract,183 the extension of his contract constituted
breach, 8 4 and he was denied his procedural due process rights. 185 Although
he moved for a temporary injunction and restraining order, all relief was
denied. 186 He appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
they took his arguments in turn.
1. Executive Authority
Just like Sherman, Santiago argued that the President lacked the
necessary congressional authority to extend his contract.'87 This time the
argument was far more nuanced. Because his contract expired after
mobilization but prior to his call to active duty, he maintained that he was
not subject to the presidential stop-loss authority. 188 According to Sherman,
the Executive authority delegated by Congress only permitted the
involuntary extension of the contracts of reservists if previously called to
active duty. 8 9 Santiago cited 10 U.S.C. § 12305, which states,
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during any period
members of a reserve component are serving on active duty
pursuant to an order to active duty under authority of section
12301, 12302, or 12304 of this title, the President may suspend any
provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation
applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President
182. Id. at 556; see supra note 26. "Mobilization" is defined in part as "[t]he process by which the
Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national
emergency." Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication
1-02, Mobilization, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/m/03514.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2006). The process "includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components as well as assembling
and organizing personnel, supplies, and materital]." Id.
183. Appellant's Opening Brief at 30, Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 425 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2005) (No.
05-35005) [hereinafter Santiago's Brie].
184. Id. at 10.
185. Id. at23.
186. Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 425 F.3d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 2005). "The parties stipulated that the
hearing on the preliminary injunction was to serve as a bench trial on the permanent injunction, to
expedite appellate review. The district court... den[ied] all relief." Id.
187. Santiago's Brief supra note 183, at 30; see supra Part III.A. 1.
188. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 557. But cf supra text accompanying note 86.
189. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 556.
determines is essential to the national security of the United
States. 90
In Santiago's view, the words "during any period members of a reserve
component are serving on active duty" were meant to provide a limitation on
which soldiers' service the President could legally extend.' 9' Plainly to him,
those words indicated that only those soldiers currently called to active duty
could be subject to such an extension. 192
The court handily eschewed such controversy in its interpretation of the
provision. Looking at the words "during any period members of a reserve
component are serving on active duty" the court found not a personal
limitation but a temporal one. 193 It interpreted this language as "refer[ring]
only to the period of time during which the President may exercise the power
conferred by section 12305(a)."' 194  While it acknowledged the lack of
congressional record evidence to this effect,' 95 it concluded that the record
was not in opposition to such an interpretation on the face of the statute. 196
2. Contract Principles
Santiago also claimed that his contract terms precluded the extension of
his contract. 97 Just as the Quails court accepted the premise that general
contract principles applied to the military enlistment contract, so did the
Santiago court under a different set of precedents. '" The court stated,
"Enlistment contracts, with exceptions not relevant here, 199 are enforceable
under the traditional principles of contract law. 2 °°
190. Santiago's Brief supra note 183, at 30 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2000)) (emphasis
added).
191. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 557.
192. Id. While the inference is plausible, the court offered no other rationalization than that the
statute was "not irrational when read according to its plain meaning." Id. at 558. Yet the court did
not dismiss Santiago's reading as irrational, nor provide any other explanation as to why his
interpretation did not demonstrate ambiguity. Id. at 557-59.
193. Id. at 557 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2000)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 558. The court briefly recounted the legislative history by citing the House's adoption
of the Senate provision. Id. It cited the House's assertion that the Senate Bill "authorize[d] the
President, during a time of crisis or national emergency, to extend the enlistment or appointment of
essential regular and reserve personnel serving on active duty regardless of the normal separation
dates for those individuals." Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-352 (1983) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1983
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1160, 11.76).
196. Although the language was deemed by the court to simply restrict the period of time at issue,
the congressional evidence cited by the court, see supra notes 193-96, can easily be read as affirming
the notion that "active duty" qualifies the type of "reserve personnel."
197. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 552.
198. The court cited to Taylor v. United States, 711 F.2d 1199, 1205 (3rd Cir. 1983); Jablon v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1064, 1066 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981); and Johnson v. Chafee, 469 F.2d 1216,
1219-20 (9th Cir. 1972).
199. These notable exceptions are matters concerning military pay or benefits, as employment
with the military is typically quite different in scope and nature than a standard civilian employment
816
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Two main claims fueled Santiago's search for relief under contract
principles. First, he argued that his contract specifically provided for several
exceptions in which his contract rights could be altered, but that the
conditions under which his contract was involuntarily extended did not fall
into any of these exceptions."' Relying on the oft used Latin maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, °2 he claimed that a state of emergency
declared by the President was not enumerated as an event which could
extend his enlistment and thus was excluded as a possible extending
event.2 °3 Second, he acknowledged that the contract provided:
Laws and regulations that govern military personnel may change
without notice to me. Such changes may affect my status, pay,
allowances, benefits, and responsibilities as a member of the Armed
Forces REGARDLESS of the provisions of this enlistment/
reenlistment document.2 4
Because this provision spoke of changes to laws and regulations,
Santiago asserted that it did not apply to the President's actions under a law
which existed prior to his signing of the contract.20 5 Under his reasoning,
such an action did not fall into the broad exception, and therefore it could
not alter the terms of his contract. 206
The court flatly rejected both of these claims. The provision which
Santiago cited for support of his second claim was precisely the reason his
first claim was rejected. Its notification of the possibility of changes to the
terms of the contract according to any changes in laws or regulations gave
Santiago notice that his contract terms could be affected by federal law.20 7
The court denied a reading of the other enumerated exceptions as an
exclusive list, since such a broad exception was included ostensibly to
relationship. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 554 n.4.
200. Id.
201. Id. His argument was that without such notification by the terms of the contract, his service
was not subject to those requirements, and was thus complete. Id.
202. "A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion
of the other, or of the alternative." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). The dictionary
offers an example: "the rule that 'each citizen is entitled to vote' implies that noncitizens are not
entitled to vote." Id.
203. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 554-55.
204. Id. at 556.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. While it is true that some expression of broad exception may be read to prevent an
expression unius est exlusio alterius interpretation, it can also be easily said that this exception, if not
directly related to those enumerated factors, may be an exception unto its own without relation to the
exclusive list. However, the court did indeed draw the former analytical bridge with little hesitation.
817
prevent binding the government to a finite list of actions.2 °8 Delving further
into Santiago's distinction between existing and changed laws, the court
reached his second claim.20 9 The court found that the stop-loss order was
within the broad exception which references the Partial Statement of
Existing United States Laws, and therefore, any inquiry into whether or not
the stop-loss order could be properly categorized as a change was
irrelevant. 21  According to the court, this reference was sufficient to give
notice that the terms of the contract were subject to existing laws in ways
that were not delineated in the contract. 211 But the court went further, and
found that the stop-loss order could be properly categorized as a "change"
for purposes of the exception, because "[w]ithout the suspension of those
laws, Santiago would have been entitled to be separated in due course at the
end of his term of enlistment. ' ' 212
3. Procedural Due Process
Finally, Santiago appealed to the constitutional principles of procedural
due process, 213 claiming that he was denied a liberty interest without any
notice to him prior.2 14 Again, a procedural due process claim requires proof
of: (1) a property or liberty interest that is (2) deprived without (3) prior
notice or opportunity to be heard. 21 5  He claimed that his liberty was
impermissibly restrained by the extension of his contract and that he had no
notice of the possibility of the extension of his contract for reasons other
than those expressed in the enlistment contract.21 6 He also argued that the
change of his release date to December 25, 203 1, constituted an "indefinite
extension" which also deprived him of his due process rights.2 7  This
argument equated the government's indefinite retention of Santiago's
services with the government's indefinite detention of citizens, which
violates the due process clause when the extent of such a detention is at the
208. Id. at 555.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 555-56.
211. Id. at 555.
212. Id. at 556.
213. The court noted that this argument was not raised or considered in district court. Id. at 559
n. 10. An issue may be reviewed for the first time on appeal under the discretion of the court if "the
issue presented is purely one of law and either does not depend on the factual record developed
below, or the pertinent record has been fully developed." Id. (citing Briggs v. Kent, 955 F.2d 623,
625 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted). The court felt that the necessary conditions were
met and chose to review the claim. Id.
214. Id. at 559.
215. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
216. Santiago's Brief supra note 183, at 25.
217. Id. at 28.
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sole discretion of the government and when clear congressional intent to do
so is absent.218
Despite Santiago's best efforts, these claims were discarded. The court
relied upon its analysis of the contract terms under general contract
principles and determined that there was notice of such a possible restraint
on his liberty.2 19 Under the court's rationale, a due process claim's element
of notice turned on the same element of notice required under contract law.
The court plainly stated 'the government's failure to notify Santiago in his
enlistment contract of each specific reason that his service might be
extended involuntarily [did] not violate Santiago's due process rights.
220
Santiago's claim about indefinite extension was also rejected.
According to the court, the date fixed by the government was for
administrative convenience, and the military guidelines generally spelled out
the parameters of such extensions .2 2  Thus, Santiago was not in fact subject
to indefinite extension as his newly created separation date indicated.222
With that, the court concluded its due process inquiry and found Santiago's
constitutional rights intact. 2 3
4. Analysis
What seemed so promising on its face to those who would challenge the
stop-loss program, met a staunch rebuff. The court took two large liberties
with the issues in this case. The first stretch was in the reading of the
language of § 12305.224 Contrary to the court's conclusion, it seems that the
average reader would find Santiago's plain language interpretation more
plausible. In fact, the court's acknowledgement of the absence of legislative
history to the effect of the conclusion it reaches further bolsters Santiago's
interpretation.225 The second stretch is found in the court's contract
218. Id.
219. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 559.
220. Id.
221. Id. But see supra notes 27-29. As indicated above, the policy was open-ended from its
inception, and any limitations placed on the time and manner of extension have come from the
military authorities themselves. There has never been a change to the duration of extension from an
external source. How, therefore, can the court merely cite the date given as administrative
convenience? If placed on stop-loss for some period less than that indicated on paper, what will stop
the military from merely changing that period to the full duration indicated? To claim that it cannot
do so misses the point that the entire issue is about the power of the military to alter contract terms.
Why would it have any less power to interpret the stated terms to their fullest extent?
222. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 559.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 557.
225. Id. at 558.
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analysis. While Santiago's "change in the law" argument 226 appeared to be
rejected by adequate reasoning, the court failed to explain why applying the
Latin maxim to the enumerated list of exceptions would be in error.227 The
notion that an exception lodged in the fine print of the contract could
reasonably be held to negate a reading of that section as creating a fixed list
of exceptions seems overly simplistic. At the very least, this creates the kind
of ambiguity that courts are charged with arbitrating. But the court was
unwilling to do so, and Santiago was left with no claim to relief.
Unsuccessful, Sergeant Santiago was forced to seek the prayers of his
church family the night before he was to be deployed. 228 But Santiago was
not the first to challenge the government's policy, and he was not the last.
One soldier, who filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of his comrade
Santiago, was now preparing for a court battle of his own .... 2 2 9
D. "Try One" Defeats Another: Doe v. Rumsfeld 230 and a Statutory
Scheme
Like Qualls and Santiago, Doe was a military veteran who served his
full term previously. 23' Doe served an eight-year term with the Army and
decided to enlist in the California State National Guard and the Army
Reserve National Guard for a one-year term under the "Try One" program
for veterans. 232  He signed his enlistment contract in May 2003, and
reenlisted for a second one-year term in February 2004.233 Not too long
after his reenlistment, on July 23, 2004, Doe was ordered to active duty, and
his contract term was extended eleven months beyond his original separation
date.234 Doe's unit was scheduled for forty-five days of training followed by
immediate deployment to Iraq.235 Seeking to avoid deployment, Doe sought
a writ of mandamus and a writ of habeas corpus.2 3 6 Additionally, he filed
motions for declaratory and injunctive relief, and sought a temporary
226. Id. at 555-56.
227. Id. at 555.
228. Challenging Orders, Online NewsHour, Feb. 24, 2005, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
military/jan-june05/stop-loss_2-24.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
229. Santiago, 425 F.3d at 552 n.1.
230. 435 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2006).
231. Brief of Appellant at 3, Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-15680)
[hereinafter Doe's Brie].
232. Id.
233. Doe, 435 F.3d at 983.
234. Id.
235. Id. Due to a medical condition, Doe was never actually deployed. Id. He was instead
retained on active duty under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) and sent to Sacramento, California, where he
was medically monitored and treated. Id. The government attempted to prevent the review of this
issue, claiming that case was moot due to his reassignment. Id. at 980-83. However, the court
maintained its jurisdictional mandate under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 982-83.
236. Id. at 983.
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restraining order.237 The district court denied all his attempts for relief, and
Doe filed an appeal based on a familiar challenge to the Executive power,
and some new arguments about the conflicts between statutes authorizing
238certain military activities.
First, Doe argued that the President extended his contract improperly
under 10 U.S.C. § 12305 by not complying with all the required elements.239
Second, he claimed that the section itself was unconstitutional because it
was an "arbitrary infringement on his liberty. 240 Finally, he argued that the
extension of his contract violated 10 U.S.C. § 12407(a), 10 U.S.C. § 12103,
and 32 U.S.C. §§ 302 and 303.241
1. Executive Authority
Though substantively different than the attacks of his predecessors,
Doe's argument that the President improperly extended his contract met the
same fate. While Sherman and Qualls focused their claims on what they
perceived to be the President's lack of statutory authority to extend military
contracts, Doe offered a twist. He argued that the language of 10 U.S.C. §
12305 authorized the President to act in such a way as to affect the
extensions of military contracts, but gave him a specific formula for doing
so.242  Specifically, Doe charged that the laws which entitled him to
separation had to be suspended under the section, and that the section only
provides that the President "may" suspend these laws; suspension does not
occur as an operation of law. 243 Further, the President never "exercise[d] his
authority under section 12305 by suspending laws relating to separation,"
nor did he subsequently "[make] the necessary determination[s] that a
soldier [was] essential to national security." 2 " Without those proper steps, a
soldier's enlistment, argued Doe, could not be extended.245
237. Id. These soldiers file for relief in whatever form they can, as fast as they can. Note that
because Quails was unsuccessful in his attempts, he felt compelled to reenlist before his case was
heard on the merits. See supra note 158. This caused him to make out a claim of economic duress
later. Though an issue of economic duress did not arise in this case, it just as easily could have. As
the cases have demonstrated, it is difficult for a soldier to succeed upon preemptive relief. When
this happens, the soldier continues to face his or her stop-loss order, while trying to litigate a claim
of its invalidity. See id.
238. Doe, 435 F.3d at 983.
239. Id. at 980.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Doe's Brief supra note 231, at 7.
243. Id. at 8.
244. Id. at 8.
245. Id. at 8-9.
The court was not persuaded that such steps were necessary. On
November 21, 2002, the military implemented stop-loss by its MILPER
Message No. 03-040, which stated in part, "The provisions regulations
governing voluntary retirements, separations, and REFRADs 246 of officers
and enlisted soldiers .. .are suspended ...., In a short sentence, the
court held that the language of the message served to both suspend and
extend in one step.248 Similarly, the court spent little time dismissing the
claim that some sort of individualized determination must be made as to the
relative necessity of a category of persons extended.249 The President is not
required by § 12305 to make an individual determination, therefore his
determination that members of the Army National Guard should be activated
250was sufficient.
2. Constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. § 12305
Doe also argued that the very provision under which the President
derived his power ran afoul of the Constitution as it "permit[ted] an arbitrary
infringement of [his] liberty. 251  The central feature of this argument was
the lack of boundaries within § 12305 to contain the President's authority to
subject soldiers to the stop-loss order.252 Under his reasoning, it allows the
government to "conscript soldiers . .. for extended compulsory military
service. 253 With a soldier's liberty indefinitely vulnerable, Doe argued that
"legislative guidance" was critical to providing a limit on the President's
power.254 Absent this power, he reasoned that what remained was
"unbounded government discretion., 255
The court did not agree with Doe's arbitrariness argument. In its
reading of the statute, the court found sufficient limits within § 12305
246. The Army National Guard maintains a searchable database of military acronyms, and it
explains that REFRAD means "Released from Active Duty." Army National Guard, REFRAD,
http://www.amg.army.mil/tools/acronym.asp?search=refrad (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
247. Doe, 435 F.3d at 985.
248. Id. at 984-85. The rationale here again gives the reader cause to stop short. Doe's reasoning
that the implementation of stop-loss required some minimal process is not far-fetched by the
language of the statute, yet the court simply dismissed it by providing a manner in which the steps
are combined. Id. It appears that in this sentence the court both acknowledged the necessity of the
suspend and extend process, but solved the dilemma it posed by a stretched reading of the MILPER
message.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 985. The court also noted that this argument was foreclosed by the Santiago decision,
which held that "the President's power under § 12305(a) 'was properly delegated to the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, who entered the stop-loss order
suspending the separation laws on November 4, 2002' pursuant to MILPER Message No. 03-040."
Id. at 985 (citing Santiago, 457 F.3d at 557).
251. Doe's Brief supra note 231, at 9.
252. Id. at 9-10.
253. Id. at 10.
254. Id. at 12.
255. Id. at 13.
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through the surrounding statutes it references. 56 Sections 12301(a), 12302,
and 12304 explain particular circumstances in which activation can be made,
and the court reasoned that any exercise of power within these confines was
not arbitrary.2 57 Concluding that these provisions were fairly adopted by §
12305, the court held that the power which Doe contested was not arbitrary
in nature.25
8
Furthermore, Doe argued that the Executive power under this statute
was delegated in a manner which violated the Constitution, 259 and that he
received no notice that his contract could be extended beyond the outlined
term. 260  Despite his efforts, the court dismissed each of these points
quickly. 6 1 On the subject of delegation, the court quoted the Supreme
Court: "[S]o long as Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the
delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power., 262 The court turned to its own
words in Santiago v. Rumsfeld on the subject of adequate notice.263 It found
that the language in Doe's contract was identical to that found in Santiago's
contract, which disclaimed the possibility of change to the laws affecting the
contractual terms.M Such a disclaimer, it concluded, was sufficient to give
constitutionally required notice.265
256. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980, 985-86 (9th Cir. 2006). Yet note that the court did not offer
a temporal limitation found in a combined reading of these statutes, and the duration of the stop-loss
application for an individual soldier clearly implicates a liberty interest if unchecked.
257. Id. at 986.
258. Id.
259. Doe's Brief, supra note 231, at 12.
260. Id. at 25-26. Here, Doe slipped in an argument of misrepresentation. He claimed the
marketing of the Try One Program as an opportunity to assume military service for one year before
choosing whether to make a full commitment was inherently misleading. Id. at 24-25. He applied
this to the notice argument though, claiming that the name itself caused him to cease further inquiry
as he had "no reasonable expectation that he could be ordered to perform involuntary military
service beyond his one-year enlistment except in rare circumstances of national exigency." Id. at 24.
The court noted briefly, at the end of its discussion regarding notice, that the claim of
misrepresentation required an offer of more than the simple marketing of the program under the "Try
One" label. Doe, 435 F.3d at 986.







Finally, Doe made an argument not relied upon by his predecessors in
the court battles that the other applicable statutes provided limitations on the
President's power under § 12305.266 Doe offered 10 U.S.C. § 12407(a) as a
limitation on the type of soldier over whom the President exercised this
authority.267 He cited the statute, which states:
Whenever the President calls the National Guard of a State into
Federal service, he may specify in the call the period of the service.
Members and units called shall serve inside or outside the territory
of the United States during the term specified, unless sooner
relieved by the President. However, no member of the National
Guard may be kept in Federal service beyond the term of his
commission or enlistment.268
While the first sentence discusses the President's power in relation to
the National Guard of the States, Doe focused on the third sentence, which
he argued applied to any member of the National Guard, both of the States
and United States. 269 This signaled to Doe that the President could call a
unit of the National Guard unit into federal service but could not extend any
soldier's enlistment beyond the contract date.
270
Doe also pointed to several statutes which he claimed formed a
"statutory scheme prohibiting involuntary extensions absent a declaration of
war or emergency by Congress.,,271 He began with 32 U.S.C. §§ 303(c) and
302(c), which describe the requirements of a congressional declaration of
war or national emergency, respectively, in order to extend the enlistments
of members of the National Guard of the States.272 Doe further cited 10
U.S.C. § 12103(a), which specifically "requires that Congress declare war or
a national emergency before the military may involuntarily extend a reserve
enlistment. 2 73 In 10 U.S.C. § 12103, what Doe referred to as a parallel
provision, Congress made a similar requirement for the involuntary
266. Doe's Brief supra note 231, at 21.
267. Id. at21.
268. I U.S.c. § 12407(a) (2006). The last sentence may appear particularly powerful to the lay
reader. As the cases have suggested that the Partial Statement of Existing United States Laws puts
the soldier on a kind of constructive notice of the laws applicable to the stop-loss power, the
language of this statute is a reminder of how things do actually appear to a reader not generally
versed in the laws of the United States. On the other hand, Doe's plain meaning interpretation of the
statute is a basic reading that logically creates at least an ambiguity in the overall meaning of the
statute.
269. Doe's Brief, supra note 231, at 21.
270. Id. at 22.
271. Id. at 20.
272. Id. at 16-17.
273. Id. at 17.
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extensions of the contracts of each of the regular branches.274 According to
these provisions, Doe reasoned that the intent of Congress has always been
to prevent the President or the military from extending service contracts
when Congress has not itself declared war or national emergency.275
The court received each part of this statutory scheme with skepticism.
Although it accepted Doe's assertion that the President's power to call upon
the members of a State's National Guard is limited, it rejected any extension
of that argument to the members of the National Guard of the United
States.276 Citing the first sentence of the statute, the court was careful to
apply the subsequent statements as stemming from that original thought. It
rejected his argument flatly based on settled statutory construction
principles.277 Because Doe could not extend this argument beyond the State
National Guard, the court found him squarely under the power previously
discussed. 278
With no more favor than that shown to the first argument, the court
rejected the last part of Doe's "statutory scheme." It found these arguments
"not well-founded. ' 279 The requirements of 32 U.S.C. §§ 302 and 303
clearly apply to the State National Guard, but according to the court, may be
extended no further. 280 According to the court 10 U.S.C. § 12103 was also
inapplicable, as Doe tried to use it to create a conflict between it and §
12305.28 By its reading of the provisions, "[s]ection 12103 identifies
certain circumstances where an act of Congress automatically extends the
enlistment of a member of the National Guard of the United States. 282 The
court refused to read that as an exclusive statement, and found that it is
naturally consistent with § 12305 as just one circumstance which can bring
about the extension.283
274. Id. Again, this important discrepancy in the constitutional description and use of the war-
making power provides controversy as to the proper limitation on Executive power. See supra note
36.
275. Doe's Brief, supra note 231, at 18.
276. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2006).
277. Id. at 987.
278. Id. at 988.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 984-88. By refusing to view this as an exclusive statement, the court easily sidestepped
the landmine that exists in battlefield over congressional and presidential war-making roles. See
supra note 36.
282. Doe, 435 F.3d at 988.
283. Id. The court continued, reasoning that even if the two sections were read to be in conflict,
§ 12305 would control as it "states the President's authority as identified in th[is] section applies
'[n]otwithstanding any other provision of [the] law."' Id.
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4. Analysis
The error of the Doe court can be best characterized as
oversimplification. The court determined that the MILPER Message served
to both suspend and extend, but gave no reason why the court should
consider such a simultaneous declaration as satisfying the specific statutory
language requirement of a suspension. 84 The statute makes no mention of
any simultaneous actions.285 In another act of oversimplified reasoning, the
court cites the statutes referenced by § 12305 but ignores the lack of
legislative check on this Executive power. Doe's argument was that the
Executive power must necessarily be limited by some kind of "legislative
guidance" without which its exercise is arbitrary. 86 The fact that other
sections may add further description to the circumstances does not cure this
problem. Finally, the Doe court strained to explain away a sea of
inconsistencies brought by Doe's claim of a statutory scheme against
involuntary extensions without a formal declaration of war or emergency by
Congress.28 7 Perhaps the most illuminating aspect of its analysis on this
point was its stated commitment to presidential authority under § 12305.288
Such a statement explained the viewpoint of the court more clearly than any
other point.
So the court filed its affirmation of the district court's decision and
settled the last of the pending stop-loss controversies, for now. Though the
case may have been settled, several of the issues at the heart of those
controversies remain.
IV. THE ISSUES Now FRAMED
With a paucity of cases directly dealing with the implementation of
stop-loss programs, it appears, in certain issues, to be a settled field of law.
The cases clearly demonstrate that the courts are unwilling to find
controversy when they can avoid it, because the consequences of
289acknowledging a crack in the door would be enormous. Courts are
generally wary of the magnitude of their decisions, yet as the cases have
seemingly sealed the casket on several issues, it seems a few small cracks in
the door have been revealed.
284. Id. at 984-85.
285. See 10 U.S.C. § 12305 (2000).
286. Doe's Brief supra note 231, at 9-12.
287. Doe, 435 F.3d at 987-88.
288. Id. at 988.
289. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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A. Closed Case: The Settled Issues
The cases above demonstrate that several issues are without a doubt
closed for discussion. These are the issues that carry the greatest weight
since they call into question the very nature of government in the United
States. Clearly the Executive authority to involuntarily extend soldiers time
of service has been affirmed and strengthened since the days of Sherman v.
United States. Though a great deal of Executive decision-making is
considered a political question not subject to judicial review, 290 the question
of whether the President may invoke the stop-loss power has been more
appropriately characterized as a matter of "interpretation and construction of
[a] federal statute ... .,,29' The same can be said of the various statutes that
have been raised as evidence of congressional intent to prevent the use of
stop-loss orders in the manner they are issued today.292
Section 12305 gives the President power to involuntarily extend the
contracts of enlisted men and women upon the declaration of war or national
emergency.293 Passed during the Gulf War era, it was meant to allow the
United States to fulfill all of its obligations by requiring those soldiers
already on active duty to stay until the time of crisis had passed.9 It was
intended as a stop-gap measure, a policy to provide a temporary fix. Now it
is being used to cover the deficits brought on by the occupation of
Afghanistan and a protracted conflict in Iraq. Though its application has
changed, the courts have held that the principles on which it is based remain
solidly intact. Sherman was a message that absent clear language in a
United States statute prohibiting the military from extending the contracts of
enlistees, the court will not endeavor to make a decision which denies the
Executive its power to extend.295 Under the same banner of presidential
freedom, the President will be permitted to extend the contracts of nearly all
persons necessary, as stop-loss may apply to any active duty soldier, and the
290. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (outlining the parameters for the invocation
of the "political question" doctrine).
291. Doe, 435 F.3d at 984. This construction is irrespective of the decision to go to war, or how
"war" can be fairly defined by the President, both of which are arguably political questions. J.
Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 39 (1991). However, at least Dellums v. Bush,
752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990), has indicated that "courts have historically made
determinations about whether this country was at war for many other purposes-the construction of
treaties, statutes, and even insurance contracts." Id. More recently the Supreme Court agreed to
hear and decide whether the President's authority to detain enemy combatants was exercised
constitutionally. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
292. See supra Part II1.D.3.
293. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part III.A.1; see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) ("Our
inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous .... ").
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President's power to call a unit into active duty remains settled. Finally,
Doe settles the constitutionality of the provision in the affirmative.2 96 But
the most controversial principle emerges from Qualls, which is the notion
that the Authorization for Use of Military Force satisfies the requirement of
congressional declaration of war or emergency. 97
Thus, though the court has closed the door on inquiries about
presidential power to place soldiers on stop-loss, a squeaky wheel remains.
Can it be true that since the United States has in this instance "initiated war
in the same way it has initiated war since World War II" the practice is
valid?2 98 The nature of an authorization for use of military force is far
different than a declaration.'" An authorization such as this requires only
that the President make a demand to use force and that Congress support
it.30 0 In order to get Congress to declare war, the President must present a
case for it, laying bare the entire situation and the possible solutions. 30 1 It is
easy to see the perceived guarantee of the latter. By exposing his or her
hand, Congress is forced to fully weigh its options in response before giving
its stamp of approval.
If it is clear that arguments challenging presidential power have been
foreclosed, so are any arguments about statutory preemption. Doe's
argument about a statutory scheme precluding the meaning of the plain
language of the central statute met a quick fate.3 °2 The significance of the
disposal of this argument cannot be underestimated. By finding no conflict
among the statutes, the court actually raised the bar for any challenge to the
presidential power discussed previously. Any inconsistency or irregularity
will have to be explicit for the court to find any limitation on § 12305
power.303 It seems hard to believe that this will be possible, given the
elaborate suggestions made by Doe. The court is not really willing to find
296. See supra Part III.D.2.
297. See supra notes 128-32. The President has the Executive Power to act in a state of
emergency, but controversy still remains over the scope of that power absent a declaration of war.
See supra notes 36, 47-52 and accompanying text.
298. Quails v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274, 284 (D.D.C. 2005).
299. IRONS, supra note 36, at 270-71. What is missing with these rapid authorizations is the
traditional deliberation and debate that traditionally accompanies a formal declaration of war. Id. It
must be recognized that situations arise in which such deliberation and debate would be
cumbersome, if not detrimental to the national interest, but in these circumstances war should be
authorized for a limited scope and duration. Id.
300. See supra note 36.
301. The differences between authorization and formal declaration are numerous and far reaching.
See generally IRONS, supra note 36, at 3-10 (outlining the evolution of the Presidential authority to
declare war); Sidak, supra note 291, at 39-43 (discussing the definition of "war" and the President's
ability to declare it).
302. See supra Part III.D.3.
303. See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2006). The court reasoned that where
"[t]here is nothing in the language of the statute to indicate this is the exclusive manner in which an
enlistment can be involuntarily extended," the court will not implicitly read that exclusivity into the
statute. Id.
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such an instance, and in maintaining this posture, has preemptively declared
the validity of the statute as containing the power of its most expansive
reading.0 4 When the court says it must, where possible, avoid finding
conflict in the plain language, it is in effect declaring the meaning settled
absent a statutory amendment or additional limiting statute.30 5
Therefore, despite the court's power to review such statutory issues, it
overwhelmingly embraces a deferential model of analysis, which avoids the
mess that would inevitably result from finding the Executive power lacking
or otherwise tightly confined.
B. It Could Happen: What Remains
However settled the principles of Executive power under § 12305 and
the lack of conflict among the related statutes, it does not appear that the
contractual and due process issues have been completely foreclosed. Unlike
the deferential model evidenced above, matters of contract interpretation and
procedural due process do not generally begin with such deferential analysis.
It is true that the two cases which raised contract issues prominently in their
stop-loss suits did not succeed on the basis of these arguments. The courts
ultimately found no breach, no misrepresentation, and constitutionally
sufficient process. 30 6 Despite these results, the reasoning of each decision
leaves three issues open for possible challenge. First, although the court
found no breach of the terms, it left the possibility open that inadequate
notice could be demonstrated.30 7 Second, the Qualls court left wide open the
possibility that misrepresentation could be proven. 30 ' Third, the validity of
procedural due process claims is so inextricably tied to the issue of
contractual notice that a successful claim on contractual notice could
translate into a successful procedural due process claim.309
As the courts in Qualls and Santiago both held clearly, contract
principles of law generally apply to military enlistment contracts.31 0 It was
held early in American history that the enlistment contract is one which
changes status, like marriage or naturalization, such that nonperformance by
304. See id. The court held that "even if we found § 12305 to be in conflict with the statutes
identified by Doe, which we do not, those conflicting terms would be expressly revoked," because §
12305(a) "plainly states the President's authority as identified in the section applies 'notwithstanding
any other provision of law."' Id.
305. See id.
306. See supra Parts ll.B.l.a-b, I11.C.2-3; see also supra note 60.
307. See supra Parts l1l.13.l.a, 11I.C.2.
308. See supra Part llI.B.l.b.
309. See supra Parts 1I1.B.2, lI.C.3, 1II.D.2.
310. See Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 357 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279-80 (D.D.C. 2005); Santiago v. Rumsfeld,
425 F.3d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 2005).
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either side cannot change his status as a soldier. 3 11 This declaration has been
the subject of varying interpretation over the years.31 2 However, courts have
overwhelmingly applied contract principles to enlistment contracts for
purposes of arbitrating the rights and responsibilities they contain.3 13 With
the affirmation of this maxim by the holdings in Qualls and Santiago, it
seems that absent a direct reversal by the Supreme Court of this widely
applied principle, it will remain the central measure for enlistment contract
disputes.
31 4
Given the use of this measure for the foreseeable future, the rules that
have guided the lower courts in their determination of notice in contractual
disputes will govern. The idea that notice could possibly be insufficient in
an enlistment contract did not originate with these recent cases. In Wallace
v. Chafee,31 5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit most notably held
that:
One who enters a contract is on notice of the provisions of the
contract. If he assents voluntarily to those provisions after notice,
he should be presumed, in the absence of ambiguity, to have
understood and agreed to comply with the provisions as written.31 6
311. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151 (1890). See, e.g., Walsh v. United States, 43 Ct. Cl. 225
(1908); Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 402 (1961).
312. William P. Casella, Comment, Armed Forces Enlistment: The Use and Abuse of Contract, 39
U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 785 (1972). Although the Supreme Court clearly expressed an intent to
preserve the relationship even in the face of performance defects, it is not precisely clear that they
rejected the application of contractual principles in all circumstances. Id. In fact, lower courts have
continued to apply contractual principles to enlistment contracts. Id. at 789.
313. See generally Casella, supra note 312. See, e.g., Santos v. Franklin, 493 F. Supp. 847, 851
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (citing Peavey v. Warner, 493 F.2d 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Mellinger v. Laird, 339
F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). The case of Pfile v. Corcoran, 287 F. Supp. 554 (D. Colo. 1968),
discussed the power of the United States government to abrogate its contracts with individuals in
certain situations, but it also recognized that a "change of status does not invalidate the contractual
obligation of either party or prevent the contract from being upheld, under proper circumstances, by
a court of law." Id. at 556-57. Though the Pfile court found "wide discretion" in which the
government could activate the plaintiff, it is distinguishable on two grounds. Id. at 560. First, the
court in Pfile was dealing with a statute passed after the contract was signed that changed the
plaintiffs duties. Id. at 556. In these cases however, the law apparently authorizing stop-loss was
passed prior to the signing of the enlistment contracts. There is no argument about the government's
power to change the terms, but whether or not there was notice of this preexisting statute as a
condition of the contract. Second, Pfile authorizes abrogation as within the state's "sovereign right.
. to protect the ... general welfare of the people." Id. at 560-61 (quoting East New York Savings
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-233 (1945)). While no doubt the government must be able to call
up the soldiers it has asked to wait in the wings for such time as war or emergency, it cannot be said
that involuntary extensions are analogous. In the stop-loss situation, soldiers are being denied the
ability to leave at their scheduled date, when in theory there are other soldiers available to serve, or
there should be other soldiers available to serve. It is hard to say that the war making power should,
therefore, require the involuntary extension of contracts.
314. See supra notes 108, 198 and accompanying text.
315. 451 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1971).
316. Id. at 1377.
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The court continued to explain why the case at bar was not ambiguous,
finding no problems with tiny typeface, clear statements, or emphasis of
critical points. 3 17 But what if one of these structural or substantive problems
existed? Qualls and Santiago dealt relatively little with structural problems,
instead focusing on the statements regarding to which laws the contract was
subject.318 Neither plaintiff raised the possibility that the structure of the
contract itself was improper, especially in Qualls' case, given it was for a
program to last ostensibly for one year.31 9 What if Qualls had challenged his
contract not on the basis of the incomplete copy of the contract, but instead
on the basis that it was unreadable or that a lack of emphasis on such an
important point made enforcement of the contract unconscionable? The
Santiago court was similarly dismissive of the notice argument,3"' but
Santiago could have made a stronger notice case by elaborating in his
brief.32 1 Although he challenged that the list of extending events was
exclusive, the court responded that there could be no intent to exclude
because of the presence of the Partial Statement of Existing United States
Laws in the contract.322 If he had presented more than a bare argument of
ambiguity in the terms he may have had more success.
However, Wallace seems to clearly indicate that ambiguity in the
contractual notice is at least a justiciable issue.323 If Santiago had alleged, in
the alternative, that the exclusivity of the list and presence of the Partial
Statement of Existing United States Laws created an enormous ambiguity,
the court would have been forced at the very least to adjudicate the issue.
Both Qualls and Santiago aimed high with their allegations, urging the court
to find the complete absence of terms or the most restrictive reading of the
terms, but could have made stronger cases with more subtle arguments about
structural sufficiency and language ambiguity.
If the notice argument was a slight miss, the misrepresentation argument
was missed completely. The "Try One" Program by its very nature has a
misleading effect on those who do not understand the wide-ranging power
the government has over a soldier at the moment of enlistment. Both Qualls
and Doe enlisted in such programs but neither one made a compelling
317. Id.
318. Quails' Complaint, supra note 98, 64-65; Santiago's Brief supra note 183, at 17-23.
319. See supra note 90.
320. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
321. Santiago v. Rumsfeld, 425 F. 3d 549, 559 (9th Cir. 2005).
322. Id. at 555 (citing United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 1992)).
323. Wallace v. Chafee, 451 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1971) ("If he assents voluntarily to those
provisions after notice, he should be presumed, in the absence of ambiguity, to have understood and
agreed to comply with the provisions as written.").
misrepresentation argument.324 In Chalfant v. Laird,325 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that if a soldier could show fraud or
imposition, then the enlistment contract would not necessarily be binding.32 6
Shelton v. Brunson3 27 provided that misrepresentative words or conduct
could render a reenlistment contract void. 328 Qualls attempted a
misrepresentation claim on the basis of the marketing of the program as a
one-year trial period on the website, but could not demonstrate reliance on
those assertions on the website so the court refused to decide the issue.3 29 If
he could have offered an accusation that a recruiter or other informational
personnel affirmatively misled him in word or deed, there would have been
an issue for the court to evaluate. Doe used facts that were useful in a
contractual misrepresentation claim, but used them to bolster his lack of
notice assertion."3  If he had alleged facts, assuming they existed, that
tended to show misrepresentation based on the program name by the words
or actions of a representative or continued misleading through additional
literature, the court did not foreclose the success of such an argument. 33'
And what of procedural due process claims? As each court has found
the procedural due process argument turning mainly on the issue of notice,
each one has relied on its contractual notice reasoning. This leaves a slight
opening for a successful procedural due process claim. If in the notice cases
above the plaintiffs could identify ways in which the notice was inadequate
such that a contract notice claim would succeed, perhaps a court would more
readily consider the notion that there has been a denial of notice where there
has also been a substantial denial of liberty.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY IT WON'T
Though the courts have been terse and, at times, even hastily dismissive,
it is unlikely that another court will find differently. The words of the
Sherman court ring ominously to anyone who would dare bring the issue up
again: "a decision [to terminate this contract] would trigger lawsuits and
claims by other military personnel similarly situated and bring chaos to
324. See supra notes 136-148, 260 and accompanying text.
325. 420 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1969).
326. Id. at 946.
327. 465 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1972).
328. Id. at 147 (citing In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151(1890); Exparte Blackington, 245 F. 801,
803 (D. Mass. 1917); Gausmann v. Laird, 422 F.2d 394, 394 (9th Cir. 1969); Chalfant, 420 F.2d at
945).
329. See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 260.
331. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980, 986-87 (9th Cit. 2006). The court noted that any
misrepresentation claim regarding the "Try One" Program would require an allegation based on
more than the title and marketing of the program alone. Id. Certainly that leaves other manners of
expression and conduct fully available for suit.
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orderly military planning. 3 32  The prospect of invalidating a military
contract is bothersome to the courts, as they perceive such a decision as
cutting against the very fabric of the operating military. This explains the
various courts' plain endeavors to recognize a strong Executive authority
and a conflict-free statutory scheme. Although the Supreme Court has not
spoken directly on the issue, the empty threats to Executive authority under
Article II to detain enemy combatants issued in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld333 should
give pause to anyone who would challenge the statutory validity of the stop-
loss statute.334
And what of those cracks in the door? Although a case may arise that
will force a court to more seriously analyze the claims of breach,
misrepresentation, and violation of due process, it seems evident that the
court will continue to resolve these questions in favor of preserving some
level of normalcy and predictability in military operations. The District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia was prescient in its conclusion in
Sherman over a decade ago, as the decisions of the past few years have
reflected this anxiety about disrupting administrative military power in a
time of war. Then again, the situations posited in which a readily reviewable
claim on any of these three issues may arise are quite particular and unlikely
to come up with the frequency that will bring this statute before the Supreme
Court any time soon.
Thus, it seems that stop-loss will survive future legal attack, though to
the soldier enlisting, it may continue to be a jumbled mess of words, cross-
referenced in fashion to just barely pass judicial examination. Relief will
come only if the United States follows its vision for reorganization of actives
and reserves and tailors its military commitments before finding itself in a
situation again where it feels it must violate its own contracts, faithfully
serving people. When it does so, it breaks the trust 335 of its faithful soldiers,
which should concern the federal government, on the most self-interested
level, on the ability to recruit and retain in the future. But, the concern
should be something more-instead of squeaking across the line of legal
permissibility, shouldn't the government aim higher and keep the faith?
332. Sherman v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 385, 388 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
333. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
334. While requiring the President to provide more than "some evidence" to continue the
detention, Hamdi "hardly requires the President to bend over backwards before detaining U.S.
citizens for the definite time of his choice .... " John K. Setear, A Forest With No Trees: The
Supreme Court and International Law in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REv. 579, 628 (2005).
335. And this breach of trust does not go unnoticed. It seems that stop-loss is having a negative
effect on morale that may worsen the troop shortage it is designed to prevent. See Mark Mazzetti,
Leader of Army Reserve Fears a 'Broken Force,' L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at A14; Vincent J.
Schodolski, Pentagon Rule Worries Some, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 2004, at CIO; Editorial, supra note
44.
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[Lieutenant General] Hagenbeck, speaking at a meeting where he
unveiled the plans, rejected suggestions that the orders betrayed the
trust of soldiers in the volunteer military. "I don't regard that as a
breach of trust," Hagenbeck said. "I'd regard that as being a soldier
in the United States Army, and this is what we do."336
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